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Summary findings
Ravallion and Lokshin argue that the welfare inferences  Ill health and loss of a job reduce self-reported
drawn from subjective answers to questions on  economic welfare, but demographic effects are weak at a
qualitative surveys are clouded by concerns about the  given current income.
structure of measurement errors and how latent  And the effect of unemployment is not robust.
psychological factors influence observed respondent  Returning to work does not restore a sense of welfare
characteristics.  unless there is an income gain. The results imply that
They propose a panel data model that allows more  even transient unemployment brings the feeling of a
robust tests. In applying the model to high-quality panel  permanent welfare loss, suggesting that high
data for Russia for 1994-96,  they find that some results  unemployment benefits do not attract people out of
widely reported  in past studies of subjective well-being  work but do discourage a return to work.
appear to be robust but others do not.
Household income, for example, is a highly significant
predictor of self-rated economic welfare; per capita
income is a weaker predictor.
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A large literature in economics  and psychology  has sought to understand  why some
people purport to feel well off in interviews,  while others do not. Answers  have been sought
in respondents' objective  economic  circumstances. And conclusions  have  been drawn about
the welfare effects of changes  in (f1or  example)  incomes,  employment  and household size.
The results have typically suggested  that incomes  do not have much power to explain
perceived  welfare. Substantial  economic  growth  since the 1  950s did not bring higher average
self-rated  happiness in either the U.S. (Easterlin,  1974, 1995;  Diener et al., 1999)  or Japan
(Veenhoven  et al., 1993). Cross-sectional  micro data often suggest a positive correlation  with
individual  or household incomes,  but it is generally  not what one would call a strong
correlation;  DeNeve and Cooper (1998)  quote a mean correlation  coefficient  between income
and subjective  wellbeing of 0.17 (over 85 independent  samples). 2
These studies have used broad welfare concepts  ("happiness" or "satisfaction  with
life") that undoubtedly  embrace  much more than command  over market goods. One might
conj.cture that focusing on the narrower  idea of "economic  welfare" or "poverty"  would
reveal a far stronger relationship  with income. We can offer two observations  suggesting  that
it does not; one is from aggregate  data and the other from micro data:
(i) A well-known  example  of a self-rated  poverty  measure is that used in the surveys
done by the Social Weather  Station (SWS)  in the Philippines. Respondents  in regular
surveys  are asked whether  they are "poor", "borderline"  or "non-poor". From the SWS data
presented in Mangahas  (1995), it appears  that growth in GDP per capita in the Philippines  has
been associated  with a rising proportion  of the population  saying they are "poor".
(ii) In the main surveys for Russia we use later, respondents  rated their economic
welfare  on a nine-rung  ladder from "poor" to "rich".  The correlation  coefficients  with
2  Surveys  of the  literature  can  be found  in Argyle  (1987),  Diener  (1984,  1994),  Furnham  and Argyle
(1998,  Chapter  1  1) and  Diener  et al.,  (1999).
2household income per person are 0.11 for 1994 and 0.20 for 1996.  Though both are highly
significant  by a conventional  test, 3 they are not any higher than the correlations  found with
more holistic concepts  of "happiness"  or "life satisfaction".
In attempting  to explain observations  such as these it has been argued  that it may in
fact be relative income  - relative,to some reference  group  - that drives self-rated welfare,
rather than absolute  income. This is the now classic interpretation  that Easterlin  (1974)
offered  for the fact that aggregate  happiness  has responded  so little to economic  growth in the
U.S. even though income and subjective  wellbeing are correlated  (albeit weakly) across
people at one date. 4 Similarly,  respondents  to the SWS question  on subjective  poverty  may
well be strongly influenced  by their perceived  income  relative to (say) the mean at each
survey date. By this view, absolute incomes  that are shared with all those in the relevant
reference  group do not raise perceived  wellbeing.
Another respondent  characteristic  widely identified  as important  is unemployment.  A
number of papers have found that the unemployed  have lower self-rated welfare with and
without controls  for income. 5 The adverse effect of unemployment  at given income appears
to contradict  the prediction of the standard  economic  model of work-leisure  choice that
unemployment  (and hence greater leisure) is desirable at given income. Implications  have
been drawn for policy discussions  of the supposed  disincentive  effect of unemployment
compensation  (see, for example,  Blanchflower  and Oswald, 1997).
Evidence  has also been found  of strong demographic  effects on subjective  welfare
(such as household  size, stage  of the life-cycle,  and marital status) and of effects of health
status;  for a recent survey  of the socioeconomic  correlates  of subjective  wellbeing see Diener
3  The  t-ratios  are  7.70  and 14.95  respectively  with  sample  sizes  of about  5400,  though  such  tests
ignore  the discrete  ordinal  nature  of the subjective  welfare  data.
4  Reference  group  effects  have  been  discussed  by (inter  alia)  Runciman  (1966),  Easterlin  (1974,
1995),  Frank  (1985),  van de Stadt  et al.,  (1985)  and  Clark  and  Oswald  (1996).
5  Examples  include  Clark  and Oswald  (1994),  Blanchflower  (1996),  Blanchflower  and  Oswald
(1997)  and  Winkelmann  and Winkelmann  (1998).
3et al., (1999). A number  of these welfare  effects are hard to identify otherwise  (see, for
example,  Lanjouw  and Ravallion,  1995,  on identifying  the individual  welfare effect of
household  size.)
This paper identifies  a number  of problems  that cloud the inferences that can be
drawn from survey responses  on subjective  welfare.  We draw on research in psychology
suggesting  that relatively stable personality  traits influence  how people respond to subjective
welfare  questions. Just as any welfare comparison  requires  a consistent  preference  ordering,
identifying  welfare  effects in subjective  data requires  that we control for these latent
psychological  differences.  We argue that failure  to control for latent heterogeneity  also biases
welfare inferences  at given tastes, since there is also evidence  (mostly from psychology)  that
these same differences  influence  socioeconomic  characteristics.  We also point to a number  of
other  potential  biases in interpreting  subjective  data, such as related to the likely structure of
measurement  errors.
We then propose and implement  an approach  that is likely to be more robust to the
main problems  identified.  We use a comprehensive  multi-purpose  panel survey for Russia
that also included  the question  on subjective  economic  welfare mentioned  above. The income
measure  from these surveys  is built up from a detailed questionnaire  and so is undoubtedly
more reliable  than measures  commonly  found in the literature on subjective  welfare,  which
are often based on a single question,  "what is your income?"  The fact that the survey is
longitudinal  (re-surveying  the same individuals  over time) allows us to control for individual
differences  in personality  that influence  subjective  welfare and are also likely to influence
incomes,  employment  and other individual  and household  characteristics.  In particular,  we
treat these effects  as an idiosyncratic,  time-invariant,  error component correlated  with the
socioeconomic  characteristics  of respondents.  Our model specification  also incorporates  other
4features of subjective welfare data suggested in the literature, notably that the data are
qualitative, and that reference-group effects can generate non-constant  parameters over time.
This is not the first use of panel data to study subjective welfare.6 The two closest
antecedents are van de Stadt et al., (1985) and Winkelmann and Winkelmann  (1998). The
former paper used panel data,in modeling a money metric of subjective welfare in the
Netherlands.  In addition to the difference in the dependent variable (which we explain later),
van de Stadt et al., do not allow for latent individual effects. They do, however, allow for
dynamics, by including the lagged subjective welfare measure as a regressor (though they
cannot reject the null that its coefficient is unity).  The paper by Winkelmann  and
Winkelmann is our closest antecedent.  Importantly, we believe, the authors allow for a latent
individual effect when modeling satisfaction with life in Germany.  In addition to exploring a
similar question in different data, we depart from the methods of Winkelmann  and
Winkelmann in a number of ways. One difference is that we focus on subjective economic
welfare, rather than the seemingly broader - but also more ambiguous  - concept of
"satisfaction with life" that Winkelmann and Winkelmann use (in keeping with much of the
literature). We focus on the more narrow concept in the expectation that it will offer sharper
results on the welfare effects of economic variables; yes, "money does not buy you
happiness", but surely it makes you think you are less poor?  We also use a better income
measure, built up from a detailed survey. Another difference is that we allow for time varying
coefficients due to reference group effects. And we propose an estimation method for this
type of qualitative data that does not require artificially collapsing the subjective welfare
responses into a binary variable, as in Winkelmann and Winkelmann. 7
6  In an earlier paper, we study the determinants  of subjective  welfare in Russia (Ravallion  and
Lokshin, 1998),  but we do not allow for individual  effects due to latent psychological  factors.
7  Winkelmann  and Winkelmann  had to collapse  the 10  rung welfare ladder  in their survey into a'
binary variable so as to able to apply the Chamberlain's  (1984) fixed  effects logit model.
5The following  section surveys  past work. Section  3 describes  the setting of our data.
Descriptive  results can be found in section  4, while our results on the determinants  of
subjective  economic  welfare can be found in section  5.  Section  6 offers some conclusions.
2.  Sources of bias in identifying welfare effects from subjective data
Subjective  welfare data are typically  in the form of self-reported  positions on a ladder
which has a natural ordering,  such as from "poor" to "rich" or "very bad" to "very good". We
doubt if responses  to this type of question  are prone to serious  measurement  error;  there is no
obvious  reason why respondents  would not tell you how they feel at the time. However,  the
literature  in psychology  has pointed to "mood variability"  as a factor in self-rated welfare
(Diener  et al., 1999).  Two equally happy people may have very different variances in their
happiness  over time, and self-rated  wellbeing  can then vary greatly according  to the time of
interview.  (An example  of such a transient  effect is how a recent experience  ended; see
Fredrickson  and Kahneman, 1993).  While mood variability  reduces the statistical  fit with
regressors  related  to longer-term  determinants  of welfare, it is not an obvious source of bias.
There are reasons  to be concerned  about bias. Aggregation  is one. Individual income
in a cross-section  at one date may well be highly correlated  with self-rated  welfare across
individuals,  while at the same  time aggregate  economic  growth  results in little or no change
in average self-rated  welfare. This can happen  if it is relative income that matters at the
individual  level  - relative  to (say) the mean income in the society as a whole -and  if the
economic  growth is distribution  neutral (incomes  at all levels growing  at the same rate). If
inequality  does not change much,  or tends to increase  with economic  growth, then one can
readily explain why economic  growth does not translate into rising average happiness,
without concluding  that individual  incomes  are irrelevant  to individual  welfare.
Distributional  effects can also arise from the data aggregation  process. Subjective
welfare  questions are typically asked of individuals,  whereas income measures  are usually  for
6households  or even for large aggregates,  such as nations.  Then inequality  within households
(or countries)  can influence  the relationship  between subjective  welfare and average income.
And this can hold even if subjective  welfare does not depend directly on relative position. In
particular, if individual  subjective  welfare is a concave function of income, then higher
income inequality  will lower avera,ge  subjective  welfare holding  average income constant. 8
Economic  growth with rising inequality  may entail little or no gain in average subjective
welfare even when there is a strong income effect at the micro level.
Another concern is measurement  error in reported incomes. The subjective  wellbeing
surveys  used in much of the literature appear  to have obtained "income" from just one or a
small  number of questions. For example,  the German  survey  used by Winkelmann  and
Winkelmann  (1998,  p.14) obtains income from answers  to a single question:  "If everything  is
taken together, how high is the total monthly income of all household  members at present?"
The resulting  estimates  could deviate substantially  from what one would get from a detailed
household  income and expenditure  survey, with individual  incomes identified  by source,  with
imputations  for income-in-kind.  One then expects  the income effect to be underestimated  in
most past studies, due to the usual attenuation  bias. This expectation  assumes a white noise
measurement  error in incomes; we return to this point, and consider  possible biases in other
coefficients  arising from the structure of measurement  errors.
Miss-specification  of the relevant income variable  can be a concern even with more
detailed  surveys.  There is scope for debate at virtually every  step in obtaining a measure of
"income". There are issues about whether  it should be income or expenditure,  what should
be included,  how one should adjust for differences  in household  size, how cost-of-living
deflators  should be constructed  and so on. The methods  used in practice  - even with
elaborate  surveys  - need not accord  well with subjective  assessments.  There may be
8  This  follows  straightforwardly  from  Jensen's  inequality,  and is known  from  the  literature  on
measuring  inequality  (following  Atkinson,  1970).
7differences in the time period over which income is measured versus the time period on
which self perceptions of wellbeing are based. Past incomes can also matter, through savings.
So too may expected future incomes (or determinants of these) matter, when either utility is
not inter-temporally separable, or the time period over which subjective welfare is being
assessed is longer than that oyer which income is measured. Defensible alternative methods
of measurement may well yield a stronger correlation.9
There are also attributes of subjective data that need to be considered in assessing
income and other effects.  Precisely because it is "subjective", different people can have
different personal notions of what a "high" or "low" level of subjective welfare means, and
the differences may not be accountable in terms of readily observable data.'0
One source of heterogeneity  is personality.  Some people seem to have been born
happy, or have persistent personality traits that make them happy. There is evidence from
psychological research that intrinsic, inter-temporarily stable, personality  traits systematically
influence reported wellbeing. In a meta-analysis of research in psychology, De Nerve and
Cooper (1999) identify 137 personality traits correlated with subjective wellbeing, grouped
under five commonly-used  headings in psychology: "extraversion",  "agreeableness",
"conscientiousness",  "neuroticism"  or "emotional stability", and "openness  to experience".
These psychological traits are not normally measured in standard socio-economic  surveys
and, even if they were, including them as regressors would create concerns about their
endogeneity. Identifying the causal effect of a personality trait on mean happiness (say)
9  Indeed, it has been argued  that subjective  welfare  data can provide  the extra information  needed  to
calibrate  the equivalence  scales used in real income comparisons  (van Praag, 1991;  Kapteyn, 1994).
10 This is recognized in the literature  on subjective  wellbeing; for example,  Veenhoven (1996, p.1)
writes that-i".the  prefix 'subjective' means that criteria for  judgement may vary from person to
person"! However,  some researchers  in this field have strongly  defended the consistency  and stability
of the scales  -used  (Diener et al., 1999):
8would seem problematic;  it is hard to imagine a valid instrumental  variable  - correlated  with
observed  personality  kaits but that does not influence  happiness given personality.
Are these psychological  factors in perceptions of wellbeing of concerm  in using such
data to assess welfare effects? Of the 137  personality  traits identified  by De Nerve and
Cooper, the strongest  correlates  with subjective  wellbeing  within the five categories
mentioned  above  are: 1I  extraversion: "social  competence";  agreeableness:  "collective  self-
esteem", "fear of intimacy"  (negative),  "interpersonal  locus of control", "social
emotionality",  "social interest", "social tempo", "trust"; conscientiousness:  "desire for
control", "inhibition"  (negative),  "plasticity";  neuroticism:  "distress"  (negative),  "emotional
stability",  "rebellious-distrustful"  (negative),  "repressive  defensiveness"  (negative),  "social
anxiety" (negative),  "tension" (negative);  openness  to experience:  "self-confidence",  "self-
respect". These are differences  in tastes which one would want to control for in making
inter-personal  comparisons  of welfare  for most purposes  (such as for tax or welfare-policy
making); the fact that a person is inhibited,  rebellious  or unconfident,  would not normally
constitute  a case for favorable  tax treatment. If these psychological  factors happened  to be
uncorrelated  with the other variables of interest then we would not need to control for them
when measuring  the welfare effect of unemployment,  say. Explanatory  power will be lower,
but the latent psychological  factors  will not bias the results.
However,  it is plausible that a number  of the personality traits that raise self-rated
welfare are also positively correlated  with income  and negatively  correlated  with
unemployment.  The above list of personality  traits thought  to promote a feeling of wellbeing
overlaps  considerably  with the desirable things human resource  managers are told to look for
when interviewing  job candidates  (Darity and Goldsmith,  1996). This makes sense, since
there is evidence  that happy workers are more productive  in various ways (Frank, 1985,
"  We  chose  personality  traits  with a weighted  mean  correlation  coefficient  (across  samples)  of 0.30
or higher;  the correlation  is positive  unless  noted  otherwise.
9reviews  the evidence).  For example,  there is a large literature in psychology  suggesting that
various personality  traits influence  worker absenteeism  (examples  include Judge et al., 1997,
Kivimaki  et al., 1997,  and Salgado, 1997);  some of the traits identified overlap  noticeably
with those thought  to influence  subjective  well-being,  such as extraversion,  conscientiousness
and emotional  stability  (De Neve and Cooper, 1999).  One can also conjecture  that certain
personality  traits simultaneously  promote  happiness, but make survey respondents  disinclined
to say they are sick. Thus it can be argued that the income and health effects on subjective
welfare will be overestimated,  as will the absolute effect of unemployment  (the actual effect
will be less negative  than the estimated  effect).
One can also expect the income  measurement  error to be correlated  with other
variables  of interest.  For example,  it is often conjectured  that the rich tend to understate  their
incomes  when asked by a stranger  in an interview  for some survey. (This is not implausible
in Russia in the mid 1  990s.)  They are also less likely to be unemployed.  Then the negative
correlation  between  unemployment  and subjective  welfare could be due entirely  to this
structure  of measurement  errors; unemployment  will appear to lower subjective  wellbeing
even if it has no real welfare effect beyond the loss of income. Similarly,  if the time period
over which incomes  are measured  is too short  - and it is a longer-term  income concept  that
drives self-assessments  of welfare  - we can expect unemployment  and possibly other
characteristics  to be correlated  with the difference  between the two income measures.
Unemployment  might have a significant  negative  effect on subjective  welfare at given current
income simply  because respondents  naturally  worry about future  income too. That does not
of course mean that leisure is undesirable,  or that there are no adverse  incentive  effects of
unemployment  compensation.  The otherwise  remarkably  high estimate of the level of
unemployment  benefits  needed to create  unemployment  implied  by the results in the
literature  (see, for example,  Winkelmann  and Winkelmann,  1998)  could well reflect this
10structure of income measurement error, whereby the income effect is underestimated while
the unemployment  coefficient is overestimated.
The likely endogeneity of income to subjective welfare also clouds past efforts to test
for the claim that it is income relative to some reference group - not absolute income - that
matters to wellbeing.  Stadt et al., (1985) and Clark and Oswald (1996) regress a subjective
welfare indicator on both "own income" and an estimate of "comparison  group income",
namely the mean income of people with similar characteristics.  The "comparison  group"
income is found to have a significant negative coefficient with own income entering
positively; the authors conclude that it is relative income that matters to welfare. However,
the significant effect of predicted income could also reflect a misspecification.  Suppose that
earnings are influenced by latent personality traits in subjective welfare via the effects of
higher job satisfaction on labor turnover and disputes (as discussed in, for example Frank,
1985, and indeed Clark and Oswald, 1996). Then the significance of predicted income could
be due solely to a correlation between own income and unobserved determinants  of
subjective welfare. 1
2 Income endogeneity can generate spurious comparison group effects.
An important strand of the economics literature on subjective welfare has instead
tested for effects on self-reported money metrics of welfare.  Respondents are asked what
income they need to secure stipulated welfare levels.  An example is the "income  evaluation
question" (IEQ): "what after-tax income do you consider very bad, bad, sufficient, good, very
12  Though this point applies  to Stadt et al. as well, it is particularly  clear in the case of the Clark-
Oswald  test, since  their "comparison  group" income is the predicted income of a worker with the
same  characteristics  from a first stage  regression. Then its coefficient  is just minus one times the
coefficient  on predicted  residuals from the first-stage  regression in a Wu-Hausman  specification  test
(Hausman, 1978). Clark and Oswald  note this possibility  and try to address it using income estimated
from a different data set as the comparison  group income;  this also has a negative and significant
coefficient.  (The same method  of identifying  comparison  group  effects is used by van de Stadt et al.,
1985).  However,  this does not avoid the problem  of income endogeneity;  indeed, it may be even more
affected by the problem, if this alternative  test it is based on better instrumental  variables.
11good".1 3 A special case is the minimum  income question:  "what income do you need to make
ends meet?" The answers  are then regressed  on actual income and other variables, such as
reference  group income as in van de Stadt,  et al., (1985).
The money  metric approach  can offer important  insights (such as in setting a social
subjective  poverty line, as in Kapteyn  et al., 1988;  also see Pradhan  and Ravallion, 1999),
However,  the estimated  regressions  do not in general provide  unbiased estimates  of the
effects of socio-economic  characteristics  on subjective  welfare. A simplified  exposition  of the
method  will make the identification  problem obvious. Let u denote subjective  welfare, which
is a function  of income  y, and a characteristic  x, as u=u(y,  x), with u,>O.  The (unobserved
and universally  agreed)  welfare level to make ends meet is u*  which is a rising function  of
actual  welfare, u  =g(u). The respondent's answer  to the minimum income question  is y
such that u(y*, x) = g[u(y, x)]. Implicitly then,  y*  is a function  of y and x with derivatives:
coy  gU(u)uY(y,x) oy  (U,  ,x)  (1)
Dy  u,(y*,x)  Ax  uy(y*,x)
It is evident from (1) that the slopes of y*  w.r.t. y and x (as estimated  by regressing  y on y and
x) do not identify the corresponding  marginal  utilities. The marginal  rate of substitution
(MRS) between  y and x (uxluy)  is identified  in the special case in which the MRS does not
vary with income (precisely,  ux(y,  x)/uy(y,  x)- ux(y*,  x)/uy(y*,  x)); then:
UX(y,X)  Dy /&x  (2)
u,(y,x)  (Y */oy)-1
In summary,  both the cross-sectional  micro evidence  and the aggregate  time-series
evidence  available could well have a hard time revealing  the true welfare effects of changes
in socioeconomic  characteristics.  The direction  of bias is unclear on a priori  grounds.
13  The  answers  are  often  fitted  to the  normal  distribution  function,  following  Van  Praag  (1968).  Seidl
(1994)  questions  the  theoretical  basis  for  doing  so, and  Van  Praag  and Kapteyn  (1994)  defend  it.
123.  Setting and data
In January 1992, the Russian  government  freed  up prices on goods and services,
which led to hyperinflation  (1490% in 1992; see World Bank, 1998),  a sharp deterioration  in
the real value of savings,  and a drop in real wages for the majority  of the Russian  population.
A sharp drop in GNP was accompanied  by an increase  in unemployment,  and income
inequality.  The income poverty  rate rose sharply (Lokshin  and Popkin, 1998). Rose and
McAllister  (1996)  report subjective  assessments  of psychological  wellbeing  that suggest
rising dissatisfaction  in the 1990s.
Table 1 combines answers  to a standard  question  on "satisfaction  with life" from two
different  nationally  representative  surveys.  The questions  are not identical (we give the
English translation  of both), but they are similar. While only 13% of respondents  to the 1991
survey said they were unsatisfied  (including "not at all" or "completely"  unsatisfied)  this rose
to 72% immediately  after the economic  reforms. Possibly  the wording "less than satisfied"
(in the 1992  and subsequent  surveys)  is somewhat  less strong than "unsatisfied"  (in the 1991
survey).  This might account for some of the difference. However,  looking at the distribution
across the categories  of potential  responses,  it appears  from Table 1 that there was a sharp
deterioration  in subjective  welfare.
Of course (following  the observations  made in the last section),  these aggregate
results do not imply that self-rated  welfare is responsive  to income changes  at the micro level.
Possibly  self-rated  welfare is driven entirely  by relative income, and it is the rise in inequality
in Russia that is driving these results. We next turn to micro panel data.
Since  the pre- and post-reform  data used in creating  Table 1 are from different
surveys,  and interviewed  different people,  we cannot span the reforms. The post-reform  data,
however,  are longitudinal,  though there are two distinct panels, 1992 and 1993, and 1994  to
131996.  Between  the latter  two years there was a marked  increase in the proportion  of the
sample in the least-satisfied  category,  and this is the period we will focus on.
We use the Russian Longitudinal  Monitoring  Survey  (RLMS) for 1994 and 1996.14
RLMS  is based on the first nationally  representative  sample of several thousand households
across the Russian Federation.  15 T4le  RLMS  was designed  as a panel, and we can track 5,588
adults over the rounds  for 1994  and 1996,  slightly over 5,000 with complete  data.
The survey included  the following  question:  "Please  imagine a 9-step ladder where on
the bottom,  the first step, stand the poorest people, and on the highest step, the ninth, stand
the rich. On which step are you today?" We will call this the Economic  Ladder Question
(ELQ). The question  does not presume  that "income" is the relevant  variable for defining
who is "poor" and who is not, but leaves  that up to the respondent.  At the same time, by
using the words "poor" and "rich" the question  focuses  on a more narrow concept of welfare
than the questions  often used in surveys,  which refer to broader  welfare concepts such as
"happiness"  or "satisfaction  with life". It does not appear plausible  to us that discrepancies
between  answers  to the ELQ, as posed above, and an objective  measure of real income reflect
the fact that they are aiming to measure different  things. The real income measure is after all
calibrated  (in theory at least) to a utility function  which can be more or less broad. It is not
unreasonable  to assume that both are aiming  to measure  the same thing, which we will call
"economic  welfare".
All adults in the sampled  households  were asked the ELQ. We decided  to condense
the highest 7h, 8h, and 9th  rungs into one, due to a small number of respondents  who assigned
14  The  sample  was interviewed  in 1995  though  our main  analysis  confines  attention  to the 1994  and
1996  rounds.
15  A range  of issues  related  to the sample  design  and  collection  of these  data  are  explained  in the
documents  found  in the  home  page  of the RLMS,  where  the data  sets  can  also  be obtained  free;  see
http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms/rlms_home.html.
14themselves  to these rungs (only 28 of the 7,405 respondents  put themselves  in rung 8 and
only 3 put themselves on rung 9). So we treat the data as a seven-rung  ladder.
The income variable  we use is total real monthly  disposable  household  income (in
June 1992  prices); this includes  wages and salaries, social security,  private transfers, income
in-kind  and from home production.  To convert  to real values  we use well-established  region-
specific  poverty lines as deflators (Popkin  et al., 1995).
As always,  there are various sources of error in measured  real incomes, in both the
levels and changes  over time. There are concerns  about whether  the variables in the deflators
have been measured well, and weighted  correctly.  There is likely to be deliberate under-
reporting of certain  components  of income, which are not legal or for which tax was evaded.
This will be less of a problem for the data from those households  who depend more heavily
on legal income sources, notably  wages from a regular  job and governmental  transfers. As
one check,  we will redo our regressions  on a subsample  restricted  to the 2000 adults living  in
households  for whom reported income is at least 90% from wages, pensions, unemployment
benefits, child benefits, other governmental  transfers  and/or stipends. Our expectation  is that
these income components  will be measured  more accurately,  though there is undoubtedly
some measurement  error here too, if only because we are basing the calculation  on reported
incomes. This restricted  sample cannot  be considered  representative.
We will also use expenditures,  as well as incomes.  The expenditure  measure is
comprehensive,  including imputations  for consumption  in kind (such as from family farms or
enterprises)  as well as cash expenditures. Including expenditures  can help compensate  for
certain  types of income measurement  error; for example,  a household with illegal income is
unlikely to report  that income accurately,  but it could  well be better reflected in expenditures.
It can also be argued that subjective  welfare  will depend  more on long-run ("permanent")
income, which will be better reflected  in current expenditures  than current incomes.
154.  Some descriptive statistics
Table 2 summarizes  responses  to the ELQ. The row and column totals give  the
number  of respondents  for each ladder  rung. By exploiting  the panel nature of the survey, we
also give the numbers of respondents  with each possible combination  of responses.  Thus one
can use the table to see how mwchAlnovement  up and down the ladder there was. Comparing
the column and row totals we find that there was an increase in the proportion  of adults
reporting  that they are in the poorest few rungs, though there is not first-order  dominance
over the distribution.  Taking  the poorest two rungs  to be the subjectively  poor, the subjective
poverty  rate rose from 28.7% to 31.6%.
These data suggest  considerable  transient subjective  poverty. Of the 1,602 adults  who
said in 1994  that they were on the poorest two rungs, 757 put themselves  on the third or
higher rung in 1996; 47% of the subjectively  poor by this definition  escaped  poverty within
two years. However,  they were all replaced. Of the 1,763 respondents  on the poorest two
rungs  in 1996,  918 had been on the third or a higher  rung two years earlier.
The panel nature of the RLMS  allows us to see how answers  to the ELQ changed over
time for the same  people, and compare  this to the growth  rates of income relative to the
poverty line. As was evident in Table 2, there is considerable  transient subjective  poverty;
almost half of those who were on the poorest two rungs in 1994 placed themselves on the
third or a higher rung two years later, and slightly  over half of those who were on the lowest
two rungs in 1996  had been on the third or a higher rung in 1994. There is a similar degree  of
transient  poverty when assessed  by incomes relative  to the poverty line. 43% of responding
adults who lived in households  with an income below the poverty  line in 1994 had escaped
poverty  in 1996,  while 70% of the poor in 1996 had not been poor two years earlier.' 6
16  These  calculations  are  based  on simple  headcounts  using  the  panel  of adults.  3,027  were  not poor
in either year; 1,244  were not poor in 1994  but were in 1996;  411 were not poor in 1996 but were in
1994,  and 537  were  poor  both  years. If we use  the  number  of people  we find  that 4,380  were  not  poor
16Are the changes  in ladder positions correlated  with changes  in household incomes?
Table 3 looks at the relationship  between  changes in ladder positions and income growth.  We
compare  the answers  to the ELQ for 1996 with those given by the same individuals in 1994.
We find that the average growth rates of real income  tend to rise as the gain in ladder rungs
rises. However,  there is also ,a high variance  in growth rates within each category.  There are
people reporting  a substantial  improvement  in their subjective  welfare amongst  those
experiencing  the largest income drops,  and similarly  there are people reporting a large drop in
their subjective  welfare amongst  those with large measured gains in income.
Table 3 suggests  an association  between changes  in ladder positions over time and the
growth  rates in incomes relative  to the poverty  line. When  we construct  the contingency
table, the Cramer V statistic  is 0.0778 (Chi-square  = 189, which is significant  at the 0.001
level). 17 While average growth  rates are appreciably  higher for those who report that their
economic  welfare  has improved,  there is clearly  a large dispersion  in growth  rates amongst
those in any given  category according  to their self-reported  ladder positions.
5.  A multivariate model of subjective welfare with latent heterogeneity
Three key attributes  of subjective  welfare  data have bearing on our econometric
specification. Firstly, the data come in the form of ordered  qualitative  variables;  we cannot
assume that the difference  between  rungs 1 and 2 of the ladder (say) means  the same  in terms
of welfare as the difference  between 2 and 3.  Secondly,  drawing on the literature in
psychology  (section  2) we can expect that unobserved  personality  differences  jointly
influence  observed socioeconomic  characteristics  and reported  perceptions of wellbeing.
Psychologists  view these personality  kaits as inter-temporarily  stable but variable  between
in both 1994  and 1996;  2,086  were  not  poor  in 1994  but  were  poor  in 1996;  674  were  not poor  in
1996  but  were  in 1994,  and 1010  were  poor  in both  years.  The  extent  of transient  poverty  is similar.
17 Cramer's  V statistic  lies  between  zero  and  one and  is a measure  of association  between  any  two
categorical  variables;  for further  discussion  see  Agresti  (1984).
17people.  And thirdly, social reference-group  effects  can entail that the level of a person's
subjective  welfare at given personal  and household  characteristics  will vary over time.
The last point warrants elaboration.  Suppose  that the self-rated  welfare of person i at
date t, uit,  is a linear function of income relative  to the mean  yit/mt where the income of
person i at date t= 1,2 is Yit  with nean mt  formed over all i at t. We can write this relationship
as linear utility function with time-varying  parameters  u,t=a+byj/mt=a+  PtY where  3,  =b/m,.
(If the model is u1 t=a+blog(y, 1 /m,) then the time varying  parameter  is the intercept.) This
offers an alternative  approach  to allowing for reference  group effects  to those based on
comparison  group means, as found in the literature (section  2). It is, however, an
inconclusive  test, since accepting  the null that the model's parameters  do not vary over time
could mean either that relativities  do not matter  (i.e., that only own income matters) or that
mean income does not change over time.
Our econometric  model incorporates  these three features. The essential idea is simply
to interpret  the ELQ as an ordinal,  categorical,  summary  of an unobserved  continuous  utility
function  containing  an additive  individual  effect. By taking first differences  over time in the
utility function  we can eliminate  the individual  effect and then apply an ordered  probit to the
changes  in ladder  rungs. 18
Two limitations  of our method should  be noted: First, the method is only feasible  with
two observations  over time, since only then is there a natural ordering of the changes  in
ladder  rungs. Since one wants to allow for changing  parameters  over time, this is not unduly
restrictive. Secondly,  we only deal with one kind of endogeneity,  namely the dependence  of
respondent  characteristics  on a latent time-invariant  psychological  effect. We do not deal
with endogeneity  with respect to mood effects or other time invariant  unobservables.
'"  Clark  and Oswald  (1994)  also  used  an ordered  probit  in modeling  subjective  welfare  data.
However,  they  used  ordered  probit  on levels  not differences.  Naturally,  this does  not avoid  the
concerns  raised  in section  2 about  latent  heterogeneity.
18To outline the method more formally, let the ladder have R rungs, with R>  1. The
ladder position at date t= 1,2 for person i is denoted  Lit. This is determined  by the value of
the latent continuous  variable, uit,  which is a function of a vector of exogenous characteristics
xit;  the function  relating uil  to xit can be interpreted  as an indirect  utility function. We make
the standard  assumption  that ihe f4riction  is static, in that uitl does not influence  uit  given  xit.
However,  we allow the utility function  to vary between  people at given  xit.  In particular, we
allow for a latent time-invariant  individual  effect in ui 1; this is interpretable  as an
idiosyncratic  taste shifter in the utility function  arising  from psychological  differences.
We assume  that the utility function  is linear in parameters  and that it contains an
additive  error term. This has two components.  The first is a time-invariant  individual  effect,
-q,,  representing  personality  traits and any other sources of latent heterogeneity,  and time
invariant  measurement  errors; ri,  is assumed  to be correlated  with xit.  The second error
component  is a normal i.i.d. innovation error, sn,, interpretable  as the mood variability  effects
discussed  in the psychology literature,  under the assumption  that these are orthogonal  to xit.
The latter assumption  is crucial; while we have little practical choice, violations of this
assumption  due to correlations  between  mood effects and observed circumstances  cannot be
ruled out theoretically,  and will bias our estimates. The model is then:
uit =P,.xit+  r,  +  o,, (t=1,2; i=l,n)  (3)
Notice that the parameter  vector  ,,  varies over time, reflecting  the changes in reference  group
income, as discussed  above. Following standard  practice in panel data econometrics  (see, for
example,  Chamberlain,  1984, and Hsiao, 1986),  the bias in an OLS estimate of (4) due to
non-zero  correlations  between  xit  and 7, can be eliminated  by taking differences over time:  19
Au,,  = fly.  Ax,,  + Aptxit-l  + Ast,  (4)
19where Au,,  = u 2- uil is the change  in subjective  welfare for person i, Axit = xi2-xi, is the
vector of changes  over time in the explanatory  variables  and AP, = P2 - PI is the
corresponding  vector of changes  over time in the parameters.  Notice that the parameters  are
constant  over time (so the second  term on the RHS vanishes) if either the reference  values do
not change,  or relative  positions ddnot matter,  as discussed  above.
However,  in this context we cannot  estimate (4) directly  since we do not observe
Aui,  . But we do observe the changes  in ladder  position between  t-1 to t. Since  there are R
rungs,  there are 2R-  1 possible changes  in ladder  position (falling by R-  1 rungs, R-2 rungs,  and
so on through  to no change, then up to a R- 1 rung increase). For sufficiently  large R one
could treat this as a continuous  variable. However,  most subjective  welfare questions only
identify 3-10 rungs. So we treat this as a discrete (but ordered)  variable.
Corresponding  to the 2R-1  possible changes  in ladder position  one can define 2(R-1)
cut off points in the Au,,  dimension,  cl, c2,  ..., C2(R1), such that if Aui, < cl then that person
will have fallen by the maximum  number  of rungs R-  1 (AL{' = 1  - R) while someone  for
whom cl <  Aui, < c2 will fall by R-2 rungs, and so on. Let F denote the distribution function
of As,,; the distribution  is normal since s£t  is a normal i.i.d. process. We can then write down
the following  ordered  probit model of the changes  in ladder responses:
Pr(AL,,  = 1- R) = F(c,  - Pf,.Ax,  - A3.x,,1)  (5.1)
Pr(AL,,  = k - R) =
F(Ck  - .Ax-  Ap,.xi,,)  - F(Ck-l  - ,.AXi,  - A/,.Xi,-)  (k=2,3,..,2R-3)  (5.2)
Pr(AL,,  = R - 1) = 1  - F(C2 R-I - PI3.Ax, - A,  -.x,-I)  (5.3)
The final identifying  assumption  is to normalize  the variance of As,, to unity (as is standard
in ordered  probits.) Thus we estimate  the 3,  parameters  in equation (3) up to any scalar.
'9 Or  by taking  deviations  from  time  means,  which  is equivalent  with  two observations  in time.
206.  Estimation results
If we use the log difference  of income relative  to the poverty line as the sole
explanatory  variable  then we obtain an ordered  probit regression  coefficient of 0.0245 with a
standard  error of 0.004 (a t-ratio of 6.15). This is significant  at the 0.0005 level. However,
two observations  are notable. First zero growth in income relative to the poverty line was
still perceived  to reduce subjective  welfare (Table 3). Secondly,  the bulk of the log-
likelihood  of the qualitative  perceptions  of welfare is left unexplained  by income growth
rates; the pseudo R 2 for the OP regression  on the growth  rate is only 0.0095;2o  there is clearly
a lot more to changing  perceptions of economic  welfare than measured  income growth  rates.
We consider  two sets of additional  explanatory  variables. The first includes those one
would expect to be included in a measure of real income per equivalent  single adult. Here we
include a comprehensive  set of demographic  variables, as might be used to form an
equivalence  scale. The second set of variables are not normally included in a measure  of real
income, but might well be considered  to influence  economic  welfare independently  of
income.  Here we include a variety of individual  characteristics,  including age and marital
status, and measures  of health, education,  employment  and consumption. We also include
geographic  dummy variables;  these eliminate  variance  due to unexplained  locational effects,
such as local public goods and reference groups  effects. (Variables  that do not vary over time
naturally  appear in the regression  since their coefficients  may change over time.)
Table 4 gives our estimates  for the full samnple  and the sample restricted  to those for
whom wages and government  transfers account for at least 90% of reported income. 21 (As
20  We  use  the normalized  Aldrich-Nelson  (1990)  pseudo  R 2 rather  than  that of McFadden  (1974)
which  is known  to have  a sizable  bias  downwards  for ordered  probits  with more  than  three  categories
(Veall  and  Zimmerman,  1996).
21 The  standard  errors  are corrected  for  clustering  (given  that  there  is typically  more  than  one
respondent  per household),  but this makes  negligible  difference.
21usual, one cannot  directly compare the coefficient  estimates  for the two columns,  given that
variance  of the inter-temporal  difference  in innovation  errors need not be the same.)
The changes in log household income and expenditure  (both per capita) are both
highly significant,  with roughly equal proportionate  effects  in the full sample,  though income
has a higher  weight in the restricted  sample. The expenditure  variable could  well be picking
up income measurement  error in the whole sample.
Beyond  the per capita  normalizations  for income and expenditure,  there is only weak
evidence  of demographic  effects.  People living in households  with a higher proportion  of
female  adults  tended to say that their ladder  rung had improved  over time. Women  tended to
say they are worse off, and especially  so for widows.  However,  neither effect is evident in the
restricted  sample,  and so these effects may stem  from income measurement  errors.
The fact that (log) household size is insignificant  controlling  for income and
expenditure  per capita suggests  that there is little or no economy  of size in subjective  welfare.
This stands in marked contrast  to cross-sectional  results;  in earlier  work we found that self-
rated welfare in Russia rises with family size, while income relative  to the poverty line falls
(Ravallion  and Lokshin, 1998).  We suspect  that the cross-sectional  results are contaminated
by a bias arising  from a tendency for intrinsically  happier  people to have larger families.
Those who became  unemployed  tended to say that they were worse off, even
controlling  for the loss of income. Our results from the full sample imply large monetary
values of the subjective  welfare loss from unemployment. From Table 4 (full sample)  we can
readily calculate  that log household income and expenditure  would have to increase by
0.292/(0.102+0.109)=1.4  to compensate  for unemployment.  (We assume that the savings rate
is constant,  so both income and expenditure  increase  by the same  proportion.  We hold
individual  income constant,  but this variable  has such a small coefficient  that its effect on the
22calculation  is negligible. 22)  This implies that a large unemployment  benefit would be needed
to attract a worker out of work. Consider again a worker choosing between staying  employed
(which is the only source of income for the household)  and being unemployed and receiving
unemployment  benefits.  Then the unemployment  benefit level would have to be four (=e 1 4)
times higher than the wage to attralpt  the worker out of work.
However,  while our qualitative  welfare effect of becoming unemployed  is consistent
with past results, three caveats emerge. Firstly, our quantitative  estimate  of the welfare cost
of unemployment  is far lower than the most comparable  estimate in the literature, namely
Winkelmann  and Winkelmann  (1998). Their  coefficient on a dummy  variable for
unemployment  is seven times their coefficient on log household income. Consider again a
worker choosing  between staying  employed (the only source of income) and being
unemployed  and receiving  unemployment  benefits. Then if we accept the Winkelmann  and
Winkelmann  regressions  they imply that the unemployment  benefit level would have to be
1096 (=e 7) times higher  than the wage to attract the worker  out of work!
Secondly,  our estimation  method allows us to test whether there is symmetry  in the
effect of employment,  by separating  the welfare impact  of going from being employed  to
unemployed  from that of a change in the opposite  direction. Strikingly,  we find that going
from being unemployed  to employed  does not raise subjective  welfare (Table 4). If you lose
your  job then getting it back does not even partially restore subjective  welfare. This casts
doubt on incentive  interpretations  of the employment  effect on subjective  welfare  - notably
its supposed  implications  for setting unemployment  benefits. Unless  there is sufficient
income gain,  just the availability  of a job will not attract the unemployed  back to work.
Thirdly,  when we restrict  the analysis  to the sub-sample  for which incomes  are more
reliably  estimated,  the unemployment  coefficient  is halved in size, and its 95% confidence
22  Note  that individual  income  is not logged  (since  there  are  many  zeros).  At the sample  mean
individual  income  for 1994,  the  regression  coefficient  for the  full  sample  in Table  4 implies  an
23interval  now includes zero (Table  4).23  It might be conjectured  that this is because  fewer
workers  in this sub-sample  become unemployed  during  the period. However,  that does not
seem to be the reason; the proportion  of sampled  adults who become unemployed  is 3.7% in
the restricted  sample versus 4.  1% in the full sample.  A more plausible explanation  is that the
unemployment  variable is picking  ,up  time-varying  income  measurement  error, as we
discussed  in section 2. Notice that, while unemployment  drops out in the restricted  model,
individual  income  becomes significant.  This is consistent  with a non-trivial  measurement
error in individual  incomes  in the full sample,  assuming  that the income measurement  error is
negatively  correlated  with unemployment.
Turning  to the health variables in our model, we find that worse health lowers
subjective  economic  welfare. In the full sample,  "health becoming very bad" has almost the
same effect on subjective  welfare as becoming  unemployed.  Income and expenditure  would
have to increase by 0.227/(0.102+0.109)=1.  1 to compensate  for health becoming "very bad".
The effect of a perceived  health improvement  is not however significant.  The health effect is
equally significant  in the restricted  sample, and health improvements  also emerge as
significant  to perceived  economic  welfare.
We find very little sign of significant  base-year  effects. Income in 1994  does not, for
example,  matter to the change in ladder position from 1994  to 1996 given other variables.
Nonetheless,  we can reject the null hypothesis  that the initial values are  jointly zero (the chi-
square test is significant  at the 4% level, in both the full sample and the restricted  sample).
However,  the lack of significant  effects of initial income or expenditure  is not what one
would expect if it is really relative income  that matters, given that it is plausible  that
reference-group  mean incomes  have changed  in this setting.
elasticity  of 0.01;  for  the restricted  sample,  it is larger  0.05.
23  If we repeat  the  calculation  of the (household  and individual)  income  and  expenditure  gains
needed  to compensate  for  unemployment  using  the  estimates  from  the  restricted  sample  (at  mean
247.  Conclusions
At first sight, asking people  how they feel about  their own welfare, and matching  the
answers  with their observed circumstances,  offers  hope of directly  identifying  otherwise
illusive welfare  effects. However,  a number  of potential biases cloud the inferences  that can
be drawn. There is likely to be an attenuation  bias on the estimated  income effect due to the
poor income measures  typically  used in such studies. And there is almost certainly an
endogeneity  bias, due to a dependence  of relevant individual  characteristics  on the latent
personality  traits that are known to influence  self-rated  welfare. The overall direction  of bias
in (say) the income effect on welfare is unclear on a priori  grounds.  With a high-quality
longitudinal  survey one can go some way toward dealing with these concerns,  though even
with very good income measurements  (by industry standards)  there remain concerns  about
time-varying  measurement  errors.
We have proposed an econometric  model for subjective-qualitative  welfare data that
tries to take account of the main properties of such data that psychologists  and others  have
pointed to. By treating  the mood effects as normal and i.i.d., and the personality effects as
additive  and time-invariant,  we can use an ordered  probit regression  to retrieve  the mean
welfare  effects of changes  in observed  characteristics  from reported changes  over two survey
dates in self-reported  positions on a welfare ladder of any length.
On applying  this method  to panel data for Russia 1994-96,  we find that some of the
results widely  reported in past studies of subjective  wellbeing appear to be robust, but others
do not. Household  income is a highly significant  predictor of self-rated  welfare. Individual
income is a far weaker predictor.  Health shocks lower subjective  economic  welfare, at given
values of other variables  in the model, including  incomes.  The demographic  effects found
cross-sectional  studies (notably of household  size, at given income per capita) are not robust.
individual  income),  then  we find  that  unemployment  benefit  level  would  only  need  to be 80%  higher
than  the wage  to attract  the  worker  out  of work.
25The large economy  of household size in individual  subjective  welfare suggested  by past work
appears  to reflect latent  personality effects on the demographic  characteristics  of the
respondent's  household.
We find evidence  of an income-compensated  welfare cost of unemployment,  but it is
less strong and robust than past studies have suggested.  In the full sample,  it would take a
large gain in current income to compensate  for becoming  unemployed.  However,  our results
point to a number  of qualifications  on past findings  about the welfare effects of
unemployment.  While becoming  unemployed  entails a large welfare loss, that loss is not
restored  when an unemployed  person gets a job. This implies a permanent  welfare loss from
even transient unemployment.  It also suggests  that high unemployment  benefits do not attract
people out of work, but they do discourage  a return to work.  Also, the unemployment  effect
is not robust to restricting  the sample  to those for whom incomes  are almost certainly  better
measured.  There could well be a large bias in past estimates  of the (income-compensated)
welfare effect of unemployment,  arising from the structure  of income measurement  errors.
It is plausible that becoming unemployed  or sick generates  a welfare loss, even if
there is full replacement  of the income loss. People naturally  become less happy with their
lives when such a shock occurs. But we doubt if this is being captured in answers to the
economic  ladder question  we have studied;  people are telling  us that they feel significantly
poorer now, given their current income,  when they suffer a shock. The more plausible
interpretation  is that the current welfare loss arises from some combination  of lower expected
future incomes  and more uncertain  incomes,  the latter arising  from greater exposure  to
uninsured  risk outside  the formal employment  sector.
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31Table 1: Satisfaction  with life in Russia, 1991-1996
%  Pre-  Post-reform
reform
1991
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
Fully satisfied ("Completely  5  2  2  3  3  2
satisfied" in the 1991  survey)
Rather  satisfied  39  9  10  11  10  9
("satisfied"  in 1991)
Both yes and no (same)  43  18  20  20  20  20
Less than satisfied  11  40  36  41  37  37
("unsatisfied"  in 1991)
Not at all satisfied  2  32  32  24  30  31
("completely  unsatisfied" in 1991)
Sample  size  10692  10894  8082  7682  7584
Sources: The 1991 survey  is the General Social  Survey of the European  USSR, April-May 1991.  The data and
documentation  are found on web site of The Inter-university  Consortium  for Political and Social Research:
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu,  ICPSR number:  6500. The other surveys  are the Russian  Longitudinal  Monitoring
Survey,  which is described in section 3 of this paper. The sample for the latter changed in 1994.
32Table 2: Movements up and down the subjective welfare ladder, Russia 1994-96
1996
1  2  3  4  5  6  7+  Total
(%)
[cumm.%]
1  253  181  140  69  59  14  6  722
(12.92)
[12.92]
2  189  222  212  132  107  9  9  880
(15.75)
[28.67]
3  148  245  388  305  226  38  26  1376
(24.62)
[53.29]
1994  4  111  153  271  288  299  61  22  1205
(21.56)
[74.85]
5  95  114  214  254  326  71  24  1098
(19.65)
[94.50]
6  24  19  29  50  71  16  9  218
(3.90)
[98.46]
7+  3  6  16  30  17  6  11  89
(1.59)
[100.00]
Total  823  940  1270  1128  1105  215  107  5588
(%)  (14.73)  (16.82)  (22.73)  (20.19)  (19.77)  (3.85)  (1.91)  (100.00)
[cum.%]  [14.73]  [31.55]  [54.28]  [74.47]  [94.24]  [98.09]  [100.00]  n.a.
Note: The number within each cell is the number of respondents from the 1994-96 panel  with each combination
of answers to what their economic welfare is on a nine rung ladder.  (Rungs 7-9 aggregated  because of small
number of responses.)
33Table 3: Changes in subjective  economic welfare versus real income
Change in  Number  of  Mean  Falling income  relative to the poverty line( %)  Rising  income relative to the poverty  line (%)
subjective  responses  growth rate
welfare,  (%)  of income
1994-1996  relative  to
the poverty
line (%)
-80+  -80-60  -60-40  -40-20  -20-0  0-20  +20-40  +40-60  +60-80  +80-100  +100+
Fall by 3 or  381  -21.91  87  56  60  27  52  19  14  17  9  6  34
more rungs  (7.86)
Fall by 2  488  -2.91  91  79  71  37  66  29  26  19  12  9  49
rungs  (10.86)
Fall by 1  884  -1.91  147  129  148  66  121  61  50  38  27  -10  87
rung  (18.23)
No change  1307  15.46  167  169  212  92  176  125  79  64  42  21  160
(26.95)
Increaseby  953  22.95  104  115  107  85  134  98  74  40  32  34  130
1 rung  (19.65)
Increaseby  517  49.52  57  52  64  34  57  57  37  25  25  16  93
2 rungs  (10.66)
Increaseby  320  73.42  42  31  39  15  32  37  23  10  13  13  65
3 of more  (6.60)
rungs
34Table 4: Ordered  probits  for the changes  in subjective  welfare
Whole sample  Restricted sample
Coefficient  Standard  Coefficient  Standard
error  error
A Log household income per cap  0.102***  0.017  0.122***  0.036
Log of total household income p"er  0.2  0427  -0.045  0.049
cap. 1994
A Log household expenditure per cap.  0.1  09***  0.023  0.088**  0.037
Log household expenditure per cap.  0M02  0:028  0.008:  0045
1994
A individual income (xlOOOO)  0.064  0.043  0.258**  0.088
Individual income 1994 (x10000)  A  O  7  V0.0  0,3054*  0.111
Household composition variables
A Log household size  0.033  . 0-66  -0.093  AT0.l'
Log of household size in 1994  -0.046  0.051  -0.060  0.080
A Proportion of small children  0,459  CL  580  1.098  0.844
Proportion of small children 1994  0.237  0.178  0.584  0.291
A Proportion of big children  -0.437  0.554  1.031  0.75
Proportion of big children 1994  0.282**  0.119  0.300**  0.189
AProportion  of adult men  0-  707  06  0f.6  12  0.8  0416
Proportion of adult men 1994  -0.088  0.099  0.022  0.151
AProportion of adult women  0.765  - 0.58  0.-841  03
Proportionofadultwomen  1994  0.233**  0.094  0.328**  0.147
A Proportion of pensioners  -0.767  0.56  0.363  0.82
Proportion of pensioners 1994  Reference
Geographic dummies
Territory 1  Reference
Territory 2  0  0  *  0.118  -0.573***  0.180
Territory 3  -0.189  0.126  -0.354**  0.158
Territory 4  ^-0.131  i).0860  .400*8*  0.1X0
Territory 5  -0.165**  0.078  -0.217**  0.110
Territory 6  0.134  A0.084  .0.236&*  0.118
Territory 7  -0.187**  0.081  -Q.377**  0.127
Territory 8  - 0.036  0k  -0.15  0.1.4
Territory 9  0.057  0.092  -0.252  0.175
Territory 10  -0.103  0  .085  0.t99*  0.107
Territory 11  -0.082  0.091  -0.014  0.138
Territory 12  0A031  0.091  v  0253*  0.1  5A
Territory 13  0.042  0.083  0.063  0.110
Territory 14  0051  06  -0.12T7  :0.1154
Individual characteristics
Age (xlOO)  0Q.033O  P.U5  73  -0.686  0:`911
35Table 4 continued
Whole sample  Restricted sample
Coefficient  Standard  Coefficient  Standard
error  error
Age squared (xlOOO)  0.005.  '0  062  0.046  0.099
Female  Reference
Male  0.083**  a;035  0.064  0.056
Single  Reference
Married  -0.072  0.059  . 0.020  0.089
Divorced  -0.137*  0.078  -0.099  0.120
Widowed  -0.242***  0.077  -0.109  0.117
Hasjob  -0.131  0.093  -0.088  0.171
Change in employment status
No change in employment status  Reference
Unemployed both rounds  -0.074  a0.147  -0.230  0.267
Unemployed to employed  -0.008  0.084  0.055  0.134
Employed to unemployed  -0.-292***  0.0074',  -0.152  0.123
Self-assessment of health 1994
Very good  Reference
Good  -0.043  0.129  -0.195  0.200
Normal  0.008-  0.128  -0.017  -0.198
Bad  0.035  0.133  0.025  0.206
Very bad  0.080.  0.206  0.005.  0.306
A health: to very good  0.211  0.148  0.475**  0.225
A health: to very bad  -0.22**  . -0.109  -. 547**  0.183
A health: no change  -0.056**  0.032  -0.038  0.050
A health: from very bad  .0.106  0.191  -0.153  0.281
Education 1994
High school  0.067  0.051  0.035  -0.079
Technical/Vocational  0.061  0.051  0.112  0.078
University  Referetne
Change  job over the period  -0.021  0.053  -0.084  0.079
Occupation 1994
Officials managers  0.066  0.173  0.126  0.240
Professionals  0.022  0.066  -0.114  0.104
Technicians and assistant profession  -0.006  0.066  -0.070  0.104
Clerks  0.062  0.082  -0072  0.128
Service, shop, market worker  -0.127  0.081  -0.274**  0.130
Skilled agricultural and fishery  0.377+**  0.203  .773**  0.373
Craft and related work  -0.098  0.063  -0.335***  0.099
Plant machinery operation assembly  -0.052  0.063  -0.123  0.100
36Table 4 continued
Whole sample  Restricted sample
Coefficient  Standard  Coefficient  Standard
error  error
Manual  labor  0.1  13*  0.069  :  0.136  0.  112
Armed force  -0,416  0.228  -0.078  0.327
Ancillary  parameters
cl  -3.499  0.360  -3.969  0.575
c2  -2.835  0.329  -3.421  0.550
c3  -2.180  0.324  -2.741  0.543
c4  -1.679  0.323  -2.308  0.541
c5  -1.160  0.322  -1.786  0.54]
c6  -0.575  0.  322  -1.199  0.540
c7  0.139  0.322  -0.439  0.540
c8  0.757  0.322  0.207  0.5,40
c9  1.342  0.323  0.798  0.540
cIO  1.852  0 324  1  .377  0.542
cl  2.415  0.329  1.872  0.549
ci2  2.965  0.349  2.443  0.580
Number of observations  5003  2012
Pseudo-R2  0.152  0.286
Note: * is significant  at 10% level;  ** at 5%  level; ***  at 1%  level.
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